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
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
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L O N D O N :  
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A

# LETTER, &c.

MY LORD D\*\*\*,

Y<sup>R</sup> OUR Grace may perhaps be surprised at the contents of this letter; but I flatter myself the impartial public will not think the points here discussed unimportant, nor improperly addressed; since you are *now* supposed to have the supreme direction of the affairs of this nation. Your administration has occasioned much political reasoning; your friends have often proclaimed the justness of your measures, your enemies as often arraigned them: in this letter, my Lord, I shall steer a middle

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dle course: no dupe to prejudice, unwarped by faction, I shall freely praise or condemn, when I speak of past times, as your conduct deserves.

The affairs of this kingdom, for a few years, have been managed with such wisdom and prudence, that the effects appear in every corner of the world: *Britain* is alike victorious by sea and land, a circumstance which, I believe, will be very difficult to shew was ever the case before. This short, but bright period, was preceded by one the very reverse; in war we were unsuccessful, and the domestic government of the nation was torn by faction; in a word, by blunders and knavery we were in a very low and pitiful condition. Foreigners wonder that a government, which political writers represent as the model of perfection, should be in a manner so unhinged, and confused at the breaking out of a war; when it is supposed that a monarchy so powerful as this, whose affairs are well conducted during a peace, would not, in the natural course of things,  
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be at such a loss when a war became necessary. The surprize is natural to those who are not acquainted with what may not improperly be called, the essence of our government. Sir *Robert Walpole*, who continued prime minister much longer than any one before, or since his time, owed the duration of his power, in a very great measure, to his keeping his country in profound peace : it is true, in this he gave up the interest of his country to secure himself ; but with *many* prime ministers that is but a trifle. The springs of our government are easily continued in their natural motion in peace ; but when a war breaks out, a vast quantity of new machinery is necessary ; the management becomes more complicated, much greater abilities are required to conduct it, and the pilot must have great skill, or he will not avoid the multitude of rocks that surround him.

If we consider these points with attention, we cannot wonder at the confusion so generally evident in a *British*

ministry when this difficult trial is made ; nor can we wonder at the unpatriot spirit of those, who sacrifice the interest of their country to their own, since that is quite consistent with the nature of man. In fact, we did not find the ministry, at the breaking out of the present war, more prepared for such an event than their predecessors, nor more willing to resign their power to those who were abler to conduct the state machine ; but warded off the dreadful blow of a war as long as possible, in hopes to prolong the peace by negotiation *at any rate*.

At last, unable to stem the torrent, they were obliged to resign their places, or rather to share them with another faction ; and then was produced that coalition of parties, so greatly advantageous to this nation, and so honourable to themselves. You, my lord, was nearly connected with that event, and I cannot here deny the tribute of praise due to you for *your share*, in the conduct of the following campaigns : they were great and glorious, and redounded as  
much



much to the honour of the then ministry, as to the bravery of the people they guided. While they continued united, the war was carried on with all imaginable vigour, and our arms were attended with the greatest success. Moreover, this coalition of parties united such interests, that war was conducted with as much seeming ease as if all was peace abroad, as well as harmony at home. No supplies were demanded for the service of the nation, but they were immediately granted by parliament, and raised by the credit of the ministry.

A late great resignation has, to appearance, dissolved this union; at least, it is certain, that the administration of the affairs of the nation is no longer in the same hands. You must certainly allow, my Lord, that an event so sudden, so unexpected, and of such importance, must greatly alarm the nation: not perhaps from a want of a good opinion of those who continue in power, but from a fear of its being the occasion of a bad peace  
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concluding so glorious a war. I just now mentioned the difficulty an *English* ministry finds in conducting one; this results in a very great measure from the want of supplies to support it. A *parliamentary interest* may procure their being *voted*; but the people, my Lord, must have an opinion of a ministry before they can be raised; and a good opinion always arises from the consideration of *past times*.

Your Grace has too much experience to be surpris'd at the stress I lay on *raising the supplies*. Nor can you wonder at the foresight of the people in not subscribing to funds, when they cannot depend on the ministry's pursuing those measures that are for the advantage of the nation. The value of *stock*, is so nearly connected with the public affairs, that every man, before he subscribes his money for the use of the government, will undoubtedly consider the state of the nation, or in other words, the state of the ministry; for by woeful experience we have often found, that the  
former



former is but too nearly dependent on the latter.

The nation had a high opinion of the great Commencer who lately bore a share in the administration of affairs ; and I believe it was very justly founded : this opinion arose from the success that attended his measures, which were in general deemed national. His resignation certainly speaks *some alteration* ; for as he has met with little opposition in parliament, and according to the general notion, possessed his Majesty's good opinion, why should he resign ? A near enquiry may perhaps unfold the cause of an event which appears strange merely for want of reflection.

The success of this war has been so entirely on our side, that we cannot be the least surprized at our enemies trying every measure to change their bad fortune : 'till very lately they have been utterly disappointed : (I say 'till *very lately*, because their success in the late negociation is quite unknown.) Finding how unlikely they

they were to gain any thing by continuing the war, they very judiciously recollected the pacific overture from *Great-Britain* and *Prussia*; and they proposed a congress, which was accepted: in the interim, a negociation was opened between our court and that of *France*. The terms demanded by the *French* ministry were such, that a compliance with them would at once have gave up the advantages we have gained in this burthensome and expensive war. The refusal gave rise to new proposals, and new answers, 'till the negociation was spun out to some length: almost at the conclusion of it, (if it is ended) the court of *Spain* made some new demands on *Great-Britain*; and in their memorial, as we have reason to believe, threatened us with a war, unless we were more modest in the terms to which we expected our enemy to agree. The *French* minister who conducted the negociation, no sooner departs, and new resolutions are taken, than the principal personage in the ministry, who had been so instrumental in the conduct of the war, resigns his post. This  
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is the short state of the affair, that fills so many men with surprise.

That there is some cause which produced this effect, is certain ; and it is also clear, that we cannot *prove* what that cause is : but from many attendant circumstances, your Grace will allow me at least to form some conjectures.—We know extremely well, that the late minister's maxim was to make no peace with France, until we could command such a one as would secure our possessions in *America*, and repay us, by an accession of trade, for the enormous expences of the war. This plan he made the rule of his measures, and we are to suppose that he insisted, as far as his power reached, on the same being regarded in the late negociation with M. *Bussy*. If he met with no opposition, what should occasion his resignation ? Nothing : but it is well known, that the C———l were divided in their opinions concerning the terms of the peace, and that it was with great difficulty this minister could get those offered by *France then*, rejected.

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However he carried his point so far as to get *Bussy* dismiss'd for the present. Presently after comes the *Spanish* memorial, which is followed by his resignation.

Your Grace will not be surpris'd at my supposing Mr. P\*\*\*'s motives to consist in his being against the measures that he then found were likely to prevail. As he was for continuing the war, we are consequently to suppose that the prevailing opinion in the ministry was for peace. But it may be asked perhaps why he should not promote a peace as well as the rest of the ministry? We may certainly answer, that his aim was peace; but that his idea of that peace, was different from theirs. He thought the terms then in debate were not good enough; they thought otherwise. And as he found the contrary opinion likely to succeed, he thought proper not to be concerned in an affair which he could not approve. It will certainly be asked, why the peace does not appear which this gentleman disapproved? And it will be objected, that so far are we from an appearance of peace,



peace, that new preparations are now making for war.

Your Grace knows very well, how impossible it is to point out particulars in such affairs as these. When we argue from conjecture, we must be content with appearances, and not expect to have every assertion grounded on facts. The notion which I have advanced, is entirely consistent with the objections here supposed to be formed. Two campaigns passed after the *Marlborough* ministry was removed from their employments, but it was clearly foreseen, what turn the affairs of the nation would take when a new set came in, whose hopes, and *private interests* were founded in a *speedy peace*. And accordingly, at the peace of *Utrecht*, the advantages of a long and glorious war were given up, and sacrificed to the private views of a new faction.

The *Oxford* party then found themselves unable to continue a war, which required great supplies to be raised, by the credit of



the ministry ; and as the duration of their power depended on a peace, they hastily patched one up, which has been the evident occasion of every war that has happened since that time. They acted in almost the very same manner as a succeeding ministry did, in a peace concluded not a great while ago ; when another ministry, your Grace very well knows which I mean, followed their example, and by so doing, brought their country into that terrible situation, from which it was so lately retrieved.

Nothing can be more pernicious to the interest of any nation, than the conclusion of hasty treaties, made more to answer private than public ends. It is always the certain sign of an unsettled government, and wavering measures ; and consequently must disgust other powers, whom it would be greatly for our advantage to have for allies. The *Dutch* were of infinite service to the common cause in the queen's war ; and although great complaints every now and then were made of  
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their not furnishing the quota's towards the war, which they were obliged to do by treaty, yet they really bore a very considerable share in it, and acted with great vigour throughout it. The infamous peace of *Utrecht* forced them to give up many advantages which their interest required should be secured to them, because they were unable to continue the war without our assistance. The finest opportunity was thrown away of securing the neighbours of *France* from her incroachments ; and that critical moment lost, which, till the present time, never occurred again.

Could we wonder, with any reason, my Lord, at the caution of our friends the *Dutch*, at the beginning of the last war ? At *Utrecht* they were forced into a treaty against the mutual engagements of both nations ; and when a second war broke out, they certainly acted with great prudence, in not being hasty in such alliances ; nor can we blame them for the backwardness they shewed, during the whole war :  
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it was but just policy. They had before been deceived by our government, and they determined not to make too great a risque on the faith of it again. In *England* we abused them for this conduct, and readily attributed their motives to the influence of *French* gold : but did the ensuing peace convince them that their suspicions were groundless ? so far from it, that your Grace very well knows it was a second *Utrecht*. The interests of this nation, and its allies were given up ; not from an inability to continue the war, but for its necessity to secure private interests.

At the opening of the present war, we, as usual, endeavoured to involve the *Dutch* in it ; but experience had made them too wise to put any trust in a government so unstable in its foundations, and so fluctuating in its measures. They had twice paid extremely dear for their alliances with us ; common prudence now taught them to renounce any offensive connection with us, to despise our ministry, and laugh at our remonstrances. Thus, my Lord D \* \* \*,  
we



we lost the assistance of this powerful people, which would have been of very great consequence to us in the late campaigns. I believe the most sensible politicians will agree, that it would have been much more advantageous for us to have made *Flanders* the seat of war, than the country on the other side the *Rhine*: those fortresses which were heretofore so famous, are no longer the same places, and the ease of supplying an army in *Flanders*, especially when the *Dutch* were our friends, must naturally be much greater, than where the war is now carried on.

Your Grace will readily perceive from what I have said, that I am of opinion, a peace at present, may not be so far off as is commonly imagined. As to the preparations for war, they appear as a gale, which may very speedily be blown over. If this peace is so far off, and an answer given to the *Spanish* memorial that is agreeable to the interest of this nation; it forms a contradiction to the Great Commoner's resigning his post at so critical a time.



time. Have we the least reason to suppose that he would take this step merely from caprice? Is it not rather much more likely, that his motive was the disapprobation of the measures which he perceived were then going to be executed? His interest in the administration was not considerable enough, to direct the affairs of peace and war; perhaps it would have been for the interest of this nation, if it had been so. I would not be supposed from hence, to intimate that we are just going to have a peace: I would only shew, that new maxims have been adopted, which, I apprehend, will in the end be productive of such a one as Mr. P \* \* \* would never have approved.

The present campaign, my Lord, is not yet finished; so that there is time enough yet this winter, to conclude a very *admirable* peace. I don't know whether we have not one or two first rate peace-makers in this kingdom, that would patch up another *Utrecht* in a month, or perhaps less time. 'Tis true, your Grace's abilities are perfectly well known; your disinterestedness

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is very celebrated ; but above all, your former administration has rendered you so *deservedly famous*, that *Britain* cannot but regard you as one of her guardian angels, and the chief pillar of the state ; so that we can have little to fear, as long as your Grace's infinite abilities are employed in the service of your \* \* \* \* the meaning, my Lord D \* \* \*, must be very obvious.

The present ministry, my Lord, should certainly consider the opinion of the people ; if they are persuaded that the administration of affairs is in the hands of men who will only consider the nation's good, supplies will easily be raised ; and while that is the case, the war may easily be continued. But if any change happens, which should give the people reason to suspect that *new maxims are adopted* ; can it be supposed they will subscribe to funds ? if the ministry have not credit enough with the moneyed men to raise the supplies, they must either resign their power to those who have more credit than themselves, or make a  
D peace,

peace, and by so doing finish the period of wanting such immense sums. As to the first point, I shall say nothing of that; but the second is much more probable.

The national debt, my Lord, is now become an object of very serious concern to this nation: it would not require a great deal of reasoning to prove, that there is at this time a real crisis in our affairs, and arising, in a very great measure, from this enormous debt. The very interest of it now amounts to upward of three millions, *visibly!* And I have great reason to believe that when accounts come to be settled, it may disclose some unexpected items, that will not a little surprize the nation. When a government is so immensely involved, those people who lend money to it, will be very observing how its affairs go: a strong proof of this, is the effect which good or bad success has on the price of stocks. For if the very interest of the debt amounts to so considerable a part of the annual revenue of the kingdom, the value of the principal will



will depend entirely on the riches of the nation ; and it is very well known how nearly connected these riches are with the terms of every treaty of peace we conclude. I will readily allow that this debt is not an object of dread, if we encrease our trade by the ensuing peace in proportion to the encrease of debt. But, if on the contrary, we should considerably increase the burthen, without, at the same time, enabling ourselves to bear it, we must be making hasty strides toward bankruptcy.

The terms of peace, which I am informed by very good authority, were rejected as long as a certain great man was in the administration, were such as could not be agreed to by us, the least consistently with our interests. There were some particular articles which concerned our trade more nearly than the rest ; the one was yielding up *Guadalupe* to *France* ; and another returning them *Canada*, reserving only a *barrier* ; giving them liberty to fish on the banks of *Newfound-*

land, and ceding the isle *Sable* to them for drying their fish. I shall not make a minute enquiry into the expediency of agreeing to these articles; but pronounce them to be extremely bad. We certainly went to war to secure our colonies in *North-America*; this work, if such a peace ensues, we shall evidently have to perform again. As we have been at such an immense expence in prosecuting the war, we may reasonably expect some advantage from it; and how can this be obtained but by retaining our acquisitions? If we give up *Guadalupe*, we give up an immense trade with it; that valuable island produces as much sugar as *Martinico*, and maintains a great number of sailors yearly. The preserving so valuable a conquest will very greatly assist in repaying us our expence in making war. The *Newfoundland* fishery is another prodigiously important branch of trade: even while the *French* had by treaty only a small share of it, they were able to undersell us in the principal markets of *Europe*, and consequently almost ingrossed the trade; what therefore will they



they do when they have the island of *Sable* in their possession, which is so well situated for the fishery? Why it will most certainly be found a second *Cape-Breton* to them, and their fishery will be just as valuable to them as it was before the breaking out of the present war. Thus we shall give up the very point for which war was commenced; and plunge ourselves into a most enormous expence, without gaining any equivalent, or means to bear it.

The people of this nation are deceived with respect to the stability of their commerce. Some men fancy from the immensity of trade we now possess, that we shall continue to keep it. But if such a peace as I have just mentioned is concluded, nothing can be more fallacious than this notion. *Great-Britain*, I believe I may with safety say, never possessed so extensive a commerce; but a very great part of it is owing to the destruction of that of *France*. We now serve a multitude of markets, which the *French* before had entirely to themselves; and although  
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neutral nations have profited by the war between us, yet some branches are entirely in our possession. The cod fishery *now* brings prodigious sums into this kingdom: our sugar trade is also greatly increased; and the demand for our manufactures in *North-America* is infinitely superior to what it ever was before. These are the advantages we enjoy at present; but will this, my Lord, be the case after such a peace? Every article will be totally different. Our trade will be very different from what it is now; our neighbours, the industrious *French*, will soon possess a flourishing commerce; and as their's increase, our's must necessarily diminish. At present we do not feel the burthen of our national debt so extremely heavy; but what shall we do when we have lost such considerable branches of our trade, which is the source of our riches, and which alone enables us to pay three millions a year in interest?

Doubtless the great Commoner considered these points with that attention which  
their



their importance deserves ; and he could not reflect on them without seeing the absolute necessity of making a *very good peace*. He indeed had spent many millions, or to speak more to the present purpose, had greatly increased the debt of the nation ; but then must not any other minister have done the same ; and perhaps without making such great acquisitions as we have done during his administration ? Have not every minister since we have had a debt done the same ? But whoever spent the nation's money so much to its advantage ? Mr. P \* \* \* certainly knew the consequences of running so deep in debt ; but he also knew, that such a peace as he proposed to make, would fully enable us to bear the weight of the burthen laid on us to obtain it.

Now, my Lord D \* \* \*, we have some reason to fear, this nation will find, at a peace, her debt immensely increased, without a proportionable increase of trade. This is a very serious consideration, and must strike a terror into every honest man  
who

who loves his country.——Here it will naturally be asked why the ministers, who remain in employment, may not be as able to conclude a good peace as Mr. P\*\*\*? This is a question which at first sight appears to carry some degree of reason with it: but may I not answer, my Lord, that without considering their abilities, we should reflect on the motive which induced that gentleman to resign; which I have already shewed to be his disapprobation of the measures then pursuing. This clearly tells us, that the present ministry were of a different opinion from him; or in other words, that they were inclined to a peace which he did not think good enough: Is it likely, my Lord D\*\*\*, that this party should have changed their notion since his resignation? Nothing surely so improbable! I have explained how many reasons they may have to make a peace; nay, that they will be necessitated to it, for want of supplies.

It has been very currently reported, that one material reason for this great man's  
 resignation



resignation, was his being strongly opposed in his design of entering into a war with *Spain*. I shall not here enter into a minute enquiry concerning the particular points on which the wisdom of such a measure would depend ; but one thing is very certain, that the affair of a *Spanish* war, and a peace with *France*, were very nearly connected. A war with *Spain* would have thoroughly convinced the nation that the ministry were determined never to agree to an indifferent peace. The great Commoner was for entering immediately into one : What could be his motives, my Lord, for such a conduct ? Sure he did not form the scheme without having some reasons for it. Was not the memorial of the court of *Spain*, which I have before mentioned, the cause of it ? Do we not know from undoubted authority, that the *Spaniards*, for some time past, and even at present, have been making very great preparations for war ? What is the meaning of this ? Does it not correspond with that memorial ? Were we not threatened in it with a war ? It is true

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the *Gazette* has told us, we need not have any fears of such an event ; but is not that article since Mr. P\*\*\*'s resignation ?— Does not such a concatenation of circumstances clearly shew, that there is much more behind the curtain relating to a peace, than appears to the world ? If the demands of *Spain* were refused, and the ministry were determined to prosecute the war with vigour, why should the great Commoner resign at such a critical period ?

In short, my Lord D——, the *Gazette* may tell us just what tales it pleases, and the *emissaries of the present m———y* may scatter their reports in every corner of the town, to make us believe that the resignation will have no consequences ; yet the inquisitive minds of reflecting people, will believe their own reason sooner than any assurances that can be given them. The present m———y perhaps would continue the war till they could procure a good peace ; but their abilities must be considered, and their interest. No doubt we shall hear of the most pompous shews of  
warlike



warlike designs till the f——ies for next year are granted, and if possible, raised ; but then, *I, my Lord*, shall expect to hear a different tale.————

The people in general of this nation form a very just opinion of the ministers who conduct the public affairs : they judge by a sign, which, in these cases, with a few exceptions, seldom deceives ; and that is, *success*. It cannot be wondered at, that we should have been very fond of Mr. P—— ; it would have been extremely ungrateful if we had not. He, by the wisdom of his councils, and his well-formed plans of action, brought his country to its present high pitch of glory and prosperity. He succeeded a set of men who were unable to conduct the great machine of the state, and who in many, very many instances, had proved how little they regarded the interest of their country, when it came to be balanced by their own. Such an administration had reduced us to that low degree, from which his abilities raised us. Is it not therefore very natural,



that we should have a great opinion of a man who, with no impropriety, has often been called the *saviour of his country*? It would be stupidity or malignity to deny this just tribute to a minister, to whom we are so greatly indebted: there are few objects but what have their light and dark sides; unhappily——it gives me pain to proceed——but impartiality must be satisfied.

Somebody has observed, that there is no virtue which has stood the test less successfully than patriotism: giving up every thing for one's country, is indeed a very severe trial for the human mind to undergo, in an age when this virtue is not in the greatest repute. Among the antient *Romans*, children were taught to revere it, as soon as their minds would admit of such an idea; and when they grew up, they had not only their own sentiments to strengthen their resolutions, but the animating example of their countrymen. In the present times the case is extremely different; so great a change has ensued, that a *real patriot*



*triot* would now be the wonder and admiration of his age. Had the great Commoner, whom I have so often mentioned, retired from public business without that pension, which, I fear, will be so fatal to his fame : had he given up the great emoluments of his office ; the high power, the splendor which is annexed to a minister of state ; had he sacrificed these to his reputation, and to a sincere desire of acting only for the service of his country ; what might not the great man have done ? who would not have adored the name of *P—t* ! Could a pension give an honest man that secret satisfaction which results from a knowledge of having given up every thing for the service of ones country ? would not the admiration of a whole people, make some amends for the want of this pension ? If money was wanted, would not this great and opulent city have settled a pension on him, equal, or superior, to what he now receives ? Which would have been most honourable, to have received it as a reward for his services, from those who could not flatter in such a case, or from a  
 ministry,



ministry, as a b—be? a b—be to stop his mouth in the H——e of C——s? But supposing his honour too delicate to agree to such a proposal, though it certainly would be the greatest honour he could receive, as it would be the strongest proof of his deserts, could the present ministry have preserved their power against such an opposition in parliament as the great Commoner ought, in conscience, to have made, if he retired from business merely because he did not approve of the then measures? Is it not every man's duty, not only to serve his country by acting himself for its interests, but in preventing others from acting contrary to them? If he thought his opposition would have brought him again into power, and if he knew that he acted for the good of his country when he was in power, he ought to have made such an opposition. And his receiving this pension; this cause of his downfall in the minds of his countrymen, at such a time, tells us very plainly, that the present ministry will receive no opposition from him, let their measures be —————.

What



What could a ministry expect from the consequences of making a bad peace, if they were vigorously opposed in the H—e of C———s? Indeed it would be such a restraint on their actions, that we should not be in any danger of seeing a bad one concluded; for they, if they had such designs, would not be able to keep their seats till they had made one; and if they did by any means effect it, a parliamentary enquiry might be once more set on foot, and perhaps to the great advantage of the nation.

If the present m———y had designs of making a peace, at any rate, to preserve themselves in p——r, and found their interest strong enough to carry their point; if this, I say, was the case, they acted very prudently in stopping the mouth of a man whose voice in parliament would have been of such fatal consequence to their measures. Had Mr. *P—t* raised an opposition, it would at once have ruined all the schemes of his enemies; as the whole kingdom would have been alarmed for fear of a  
second



second *Utrecht* taking place immediately. His throwing up his place at such an extreme critical moment, would have told the nation very plainly, that designs were on foot which he could not think of being the least concerned in ; and his retiring unpenfioned, would have given him such immense influence, that the opposite party would never have been able to keep possession of their power.

Indeed, as the affair stands at present, they may not so immediately find such terrible effects resulting from the late resignation ; but I believe they will meet with more difficulty in carrying on the war in such a vigorous manner as to conclude it with an advantageous peace, than possibly they may expect. This resignation will make a very deep impression on the minds of the people ; they will now review former times, and compare them with the present. They will consider, my Lord, in whose hands the administration of affairs is fallen ; and will fear not so much perhaps a want of abilities *in some*  
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*of them*, as a change in the maxims that we have hitherto proceeded on. I make very little doubt but your Grace, and the rest of the ministry, will prosecute the war with great vigour if you are able, that is, if you can raise money, and if a peace is not too far advanced : there is no sort of reason to apprehend your concluding a bad peace, if you have it in your power to carry on the war ; and it will not be a very great while before we shall see what are your and your party's intentions.

There are so many of interests to be adjusted before a good peace can be concluded, that it must necessarily take up a considerable time ; or else many material points must be left to be decided by commissaries ; which, to us, was always one of the most fatal measures that could be adopted. We have made war for nothing, or worse than nothing, if we do not obtain a peace that is clear and explicit in every particular. The treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* left the boundaries of *Acadia* undetermined, and even the very country, that ought to be compre-

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hended under that name, was unknown ; nay, the very name itself ought not to have been allowed, as having no settled idea annexed to it. But God forbid, that we should have any necessity, at a peace, to understand what parts of *North America* ought to be comprehended under any titles ; for if we do not retain the possession of every inch of it, we give up what we must, in the nature of things, one day or other, go to war to regain.

It is to the surprize of every person who knows the importance of the southern part of *North America*, commonly called *Louisiana*, that we have not yet attacked that country which is of such prodigious consequence, and yet so very weak. You, my Lord D\*\*\*, have given as a reason against it, the expence of marching an army thither, and declared that, according to general *Amberst's* calculation, it would amount to nine hundred thousand pounds. This sum is prodigious, and it would require many arguments to prove it incredible, since the army might sail down the river  
*Mississippi,*



*Mississippi*, in the same manner as it did that of *St. Laurence* to attack *Montreal*.

But what occasion is there to traverse that immense country in any manner? Could not a squadron of ships be sent from *North America*, with troops on board, to attack *New Orleans* without being at such an enormous expence? I know that town is at a considerable distance from the sea, and that the river is impassable for ships of burthen; but then the country is good, and easily marched through, and it is not above three days march from the mouth of the river to the city; but the river would serve for an attack of small craft, if such a march was impracticable. The town itself, though extremely neat and pretty, is of little or no strength, but would surrender on the first summons from a small force: and the whole country consequently be conquered, as it is the only place of importance in it. How much more advantageous would such a conquest be than our boasted one of *Belleisle*, which cost us forty times as much, and is



not of the fortieth part the consequence ! If we do not possess ourselves of this country, and yet resolve to have it at a peace, we must expect to give up some valuable acquisition for it ; but if we make the conquest, such a cession may be saved. Your Grace must be very sensible that there will be no probability of securing our colonies, if we leave the *French* in possession of this most valuable region : A ministry that considered the interest of this nation in making a peace, would never think of suffering a single subject of *France* to remain in the whole continent of *North America*.

I have been very credibly informed, that the Privy Council were divided in their opinions concerning that article of the peace, in the late negociation, which returned *Canada* to *France*, and made the river *St. Lawrence* the barrier between the colonies of the two nations. One party, at the head of which was the great Commoner, was not for yielding up *Canada*, and the other, was for accepting the barrier.



I have also been told, that there was an equal division on this question, but that was decided in favour of the former opinion by his M——y. Surely, my Lord D \* \* \*, the members against that measure can only think of favouring the enemies of their country! The K— acted with the wisdom which is so manifest in every thing he does, when he declared against such a fatal article. But this fact, my Lord, shews how much divided in opinion our administration were, during the stay of Monf. *Buffy*.

The very first principles of that negotiation were very badly calculated for our interests. From what has transpired, and from what we can judge of the situation of *France*, their ministry very little expected a peace to be concluded; I cannot suppose even that they sent over M. *Buffy* with such an intention. But I make little doubt, that their real designs were fully answered by his residence amongst us. The court of *Versailles* wanted more to know the state of our ministry, and what they had to expect from any changes in it,  
than



than to make a peace under such disadvantages as they must have done, while all parties were united here against the common enemy. *M. Buffy* no doubt soon discovered, that there were divisions amongst them, which it was by no means his business to heal; and he certainly informed his court that they had little to expect from a peace while *Mr. P\*\*\** continued in power, but that he had reason to believe he would not remain in the administration long: this is not in the least improbable; for, can it be supposed, that this *Frenchman* did not foresee the resignation which has since happened?

There are many reasons to think, that the *French* had no hearty desire for a peace, but agreed to a negociation only to discover the secrets of our cabinet; and in this point they doubtless met with success. They very well know, that after such an unsuccessful war, they had no hopes in any thing but a change in the *British* ministry. They knew that the whole machinery of the war was turned by that single wheel,  
the



the *English* supplies. They were also well convinced, that if any event happened, which would lower the credit of our ministry, they might then expect to treat with much greater advantage than while we were all united and acted to one point. With this political foresight, they chose out the properest man in all *France*, not to conclude a peace, but to discover if there were any hopes of better times ; or, in other words, if our ministry was likely to continue firmly united. I call M. *Bussy* the properest man in all *France* for his business ; my reason is, his intimate acquaintance with your Grace, and some other of our great men, which gave him a much greater advantage than any other *Frenchman* would have had.

Your Grace will, I make little doubt, agree with me, that a vast deal of the science of politicks depends on penetration : most governments allow considerable sums to the ministers for secret services, such as procuring intelligence ; but we very well know, that a man of deep penetration, and



a sound political understanding, will make better discoveries than the the greatest sums of money indiscriminately applied. M. *Buffy* had the reputation of being a man of penetration and sagacity before he came here. Now your Grace will also undoubtedly allow me, that our ministers, when they found Mr. *Buffy* resident amongst them, should be to the very highest degree *cautious of what they said* at any time when business was not the immediate topic. I am speaking of some maxims in politics which your Grace must be convinced, are absolutely necessary to be always put in practice. We know what a prodigious effect some hints, which a certain great man dropped concerning the c——s at A———g, in the warmth of wine and company, (before it was known such an affair was on foot) had on our stocks. This consequence it is true was not so very important. But what might that secret have been? Let us suppose the same person so unguarded in the company of M. *Buffy*.——What terrible consequences might such a behaviour



viour have, in affairs of the greatest importance, and which require the greatest secrecy ! But these observations may be thought rather impertinent here ; besides the remark is designed for the guilty ; but your Grace and I are free souls.—Let the gaul'd jade winch !

Our enemies now certainly find the advantage of having had Mons. *Buffy* so long at our court. They were determined not to make a bad peace, and as soon as their minister informed them how matters went at the court of *London*, they immediately saw the necessity of protracting the negotiation till our ministry had suffered some change, which would weaken their credit, and consequently their power, and perhaps, in the end, oblige us to come into terms of peace, most agreeable to our enemies. These have been the constant arts of *France* when she has failed in arms. Pray God they may not be attended with such success now as formerly.



In the ensuing peace we shall have every thing at stake. This nation is not like some others, who are clear of debt, and know their expences. In former times when we entered into a war; if bad success attended our arms, we had the prospect of some better opportunity happening to give us our revenge; unincumbered with debts, we concluded a peace, and no longer felt the burthen of the war. But how are the times altered! Every campaign now is felt even after a peace; and our debts are come to such an enormous height, that this war will encrease them, almost to as great a sum as, I apprehend, we shall be able to bear, even if we make a good peace. But what may be the consequence of a bad one, God only knows; though it does not require any very great degree of political foresight, to prove, that a peace which is not to the greatest degree explicit, must be soon productive of a fresh war. *France* at the conclusion of the treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, was in such a low state, that all *Europe* expected, she would not be  
able



able for many years to enter into another war; but this opinion has proved an entire mistake, for by making an excellent peace, she was soon mistress of an extensive and flourishing commerce, which enriched her so much, that at the breaking out of the present war, she possessed a trade which was really astonishing, when we consider that this was all revived in seven years. This shews very plainly, that if, at the ensuing peace, that nation regains her colonies, which are the sources of her riches, she will very soon be in a condition to renew the war with us, which she will undoubtedly do, as that would be the easiest way to ruin her great rival.

Let us suppose that in the space of ten or fifteen years, we have another war with *France*, which there is the greatest reason to think will be the case, if the peace that is to conclude this, be not greatly to our advantage, and quite decisive in every particular: let us also reckon our national debt at the end of the present war, at one hundred and ten millions; a calculation,



I fear, which will not be found short of the truth : how shall we be able with such an enormous burthen, to carry on a new war ; *unless we reserve such valuable acquisitions now, as will greatly encrease our trade, and ruin that of our enemies ?*

In short, your Grace must allow, that if we do not conclude an *excellent* peace, we are an undone people : this immense debt must at last (and that period may not be at at a great distance) rise to such a prodigious sum, that the whole revenue of the kingdom will not equal the interest : the consequences of such a crisis must be an immediate bankruptcy; and what fatal effects such an event must have, it is impossible to paint : but when the affairs of this kingdom are in so ticklish a situation, the ministers should certainly exert themselves with the greatest vigour towards carrying us successfully through a war hitherto so gloriously conducted. They ought never to think of a peace that did not cede for ever to us all *North America*, the cod fishery, and as much of the sugar trade as is possible. These



I should reckon the principal points; but what reason is there that we should return any thing that is of great consequence, such as our acquisitions in the *West-Indies*, all of them: *Senegal* and *Goree*; and our conquests in the *East-Indies*. What have the *French* in their possession, that can entitle them to make such demands. *Minorca* is their only conquest; and the possession of that has now been found entirely useless to us: *Belleisle* we may readily return, as the keeping it would be absurd; I am very much afraid, and it has been whispered about, that we insisted on the fortifications of *Dunkirk* being demolished; which, of all other demands, is the most unjust, the most absurd, and the most trivial; and is moreover, an article that the *French* will never consent to, unless they have something returned by way of an equivalent for it. Perhaps they will demand a few barren acres in North America; or some rocky island to dry a few cod-fish upon; but sure an *English* ministry will never be so utterly absurd as to give up any thing to obtain——nothing; for *Dunkirk* is a mere



mere scare-crow to the mob in *England*; and what right could we ever pretend to have to such a demand: why don't we insist on *Strasburg* being demolished, or *Lisle*? the King of *France* has a better title to *Dunkirk* than he has to *Alsace*. I make little doubt but the *French* ministry would be extremely glad to hear of such a demand, as it certainly would be greatly for their advantage in the end.

In respect to our *German* connections, they need not be the occasion, in the present state of affairs, to retard or perplex us in a peace with *France*. I should think that one single article would conclude every thing there that we have to settle; and that is to bind both nations, to withdraw their respective armies out of *Germany*, and leave every thing there on the footing it was before the war. As to the claims of the several *German* princes, they are much more properly to be considered in a congress of themselves, than in a peace between *Great Britain* and *France*; as to the scheme of secularizations, they are also much more

con-



connected with the *German* peace than the *British* one. As the *French* have been so extremely unsuccessful every where, why should we think of making a peace, that did not secure to us the most considerable of our acquisitions; or in other words, leave every thing as it is in *America*, *Africa* and the *East-Indies*, with this addition, to secure *Louisiana* to ourselves?

Then, my Lord D\*\*\*, how grateful would the nation be to your Grace, and the rest of the ministry! Your names would be as dear to the people as ever that of the great Commoner was. You would then obtain such a degree of credit in the nation as few ministers ever enjoyed. But if on the contrary, the reverse happens to be the case, what, my Lord, will be the consequence? Perhaps you may be able to continue in power till the *French* think proper to pick a new quarrel with us; but then you will no longer retain it. You will then be obliged to give up that with disgrace, which you possessed as the price of —.

Consider



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Consider, my Lord, that the interest of this great nation is at a crisis. If the war goes on with vigour another campaign or two, we may then hope that our administration is determined to make no peace but what is greatly advantageous ; and we may bear the burthen of our debt with ease, as long as we possess so flourishing a commerce. If the people are absolutely persuaded that your intention is to conduct the war with resolution, till you can secure an advantageous peace, doubtless they will give you that assistance which the late great Commoner so often received. To convince us that this is your intention, is your present business. Some will be very easily persuaded ; but possibly the wary and experienced politician will not readily construe your actions so favourably as they may perhaps deserve ; having been so recently and so *capitally disappointed*.

I am,

Ec. Ec. Ec.

\* \* \* \* \*